retention

Showing posts with label retention. Show all posts
Showing posts with label retention. Show all posts

Manitoba opposition politicians introduce security breach notification bill

The opposition Conservatives in Manitoba have introduced a bill in the provincial legislature to be substantially similar to PIPEDA and to be the first general application statute to provide for security breach notification. The CBC article on the bill (CBC Manitoba - Proposed law forces companies to report information leaks) quotes Brian Bowman, Manitoba's leading privacy lawyer, who himself has been a victim of identity theft.

The relevant sections of Bill 207 read:

The Personal Information Protection and Identity Theft Prevention Act:

"Notice if control of information lost

34(2) An organization must, as soon as reasonably practicable and in the prescribed manner, notify an individual if personal information about the individual that is in its custody or under its control is stolen, lost or accessed in an unauthorized manner.

Exception re law enforcement agency investigation

34(3) The requirement to notify an individual under subsection (2) does not apply where

(a) the organization is instructed to refrain from doing so by a law
enforcement agency that is investigating the theft, loss or unauthorized
accessing of the personal information; or

(b) the organization is satisfied that it is not reasonably possible for the
personal information to be used unlawfully.



Right of action

34(4) An individual may commence an action in a court of competent jurisdiction against an organization for damages arising from its failure to

(a) protect personal information that is in its custody or under its control;
or

(b) provide an individual notice under subsection (2), if it was not
reasonable for the organization to have been satisfied that the personal
information that was stolen, lost or accessed in an unauthorized manner would
not be used unlawfully.



Other rights not affected

34(5) The right of action under this section is in addition to any other right of action or remedy available at law. But where the court deems it just, damages awarded in an action under this section may be taken into account in assessing damages in any other proceeding arising out of the failure of the organization to protect personal information in its custody or under its control.

Retention of information

35 Notwithstanding that a consent has been withdrawn or varied under section 9, an organization may for legal or business purposes retain personal information as long as is reasonable."

EU Data Retention law passed

This news is a little late, but the European Parliament has passed the data retention directive that has been the subject of some debate.

For more info, see:

Neurology Today: When Moving Records and Practices, Know Your Legal Obligations.

I was interviewed for an article appearing in the March 19 2009, edition of Neurology Today. The article, When Moving Records and Practices, Know Your Legal Obligations (pdf version), was written by Elizabeth Stump and discusses the current legal requirements and recommendations regarding medical record retention, release of information, storage and requirements for notification of patients when a physician leaves a practice.

Beyond the Patchwork of Privacy Regulations

Kristina Lovejoy at Newsfactor is calling for omnibus privacy legislation for the US. What's interesting is that what she proposes looks a lot like the CSA Model Code that's built into PIPEDA:

NewsFactor Network - Enterprise - Beyond the Patchwork of Privacy Regulations:

...Because terms like privacy, confidentiality, and security often create confusion, the label 'information protection' was coined to encompass the range of mechanisms that guide collection, use, and disclosure of information. An information-protection regulation is one that enforces the right of privacy by dictating, among other things, requirements for maintaining the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of protected data.

In general, a strong information-protection plan would require the following:

1. Establishing ownership and accountability within the organization for confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

2. Identifying the reasons for obtaining private information from an end user and making those reasons available.

3. Establishing mechanisms for gaining consent of the end user before collecting private information.

4. Limiting collection of private information only to that information you need for business purposes.

5. Limiting use and disclosure only for the purposes for which you have gained consent, and limiting retention of information to a period specified by law or by user consent.

6. Ensuring that information collected is accurate.

7. Implementing administrative, technical, and physical controls around information to ensure its confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

8. Creating a culture of openness so that if the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the information is breached in a significant way, the user is notified.

9. Providing the end user with documented escalation policy and process.

In the U.S., information-protection mandates have generally had impact only in certain market segments, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in healthcare industry and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) in the banking sector.

Will there be increased pressure to regulate other industries? Yes. Will there be impetus for creating an Omnibus Information Protection regulation? Definitely.

Privacy Presentations Galore!

Phew! It has been a busy week. I flew back from Vancouver on Monday and hit the ground running. I gave four presentation this week, all of which are available for download for anyone who is interested.


I think I only have one presentation next week, but it's in Toronto. I'm getting too scared to look at my calendar, these days ...

Entertainment industry accused of 'trying to hijack data retention directive'

Many people are willing to sacrifice some privacy to gain increased security. In this "age of terrorism", initiatives such as the European Data Retention Directive and the Canadian Lawful Access proposals seem more palatable when we are told they are essential to protecting against serious crimes such as terrorism. The European Data Protection Directive has consistenly been "sold" as being limited to protecting the continent against terrorism. Now, representatives of the entertainment industry are making the request that the retained information be available for investigations of copyright and other IP violations. Critics are saying that the entertainment industry is trying to hijack the directive. See: Entertainment industry 'trying to hijack data retention directive' - ZDNet UK News.

Also, check out the discussion on Slashdot: Slashdot | Music Industry 'trying to hijack EU data laws'.

Update (20051127) from Schneier on Security: European Terrorism Law and Music Downloaders:

"Our society definitely needs a serious conversation about the fundamental freedoms we are sacrificing in a misguided attempt to keep us safe from terrorism. It feels both surreal and sickening to have to defend out fundamental freedoms against those who want to stop people from sharing music. How is possible that we can contemplate so much damage to our society simply to protect the business model of a handful of companies."

I'll just run your card through our computer ...

How to not be a law enforcement tool ...

The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has released a document entitled Best Practices for Online Service Providers. In response to Online Service Providers being continually subjected to subpoenas and warrants for log files, EFF argues that unless there is a legislated or reguatory need to archive data, OSPs should not keep any user info they don't need.

Best Practices for Online Service Providers:

"...The best way to protect against the risk of log artifacts on disk is to never create any user logs in the first place. This is the ideal and safest solution even though it is often impractical. By reconfiguring the logging preferences in server applications, one can easily change the log level to record nothing about network events. But for most OSPs, these logs are necessary for network troubleshooting and security precautions. This is also virtually impossible for large, for-profit providers that need to maintain billing and subscriber contact information. Thus, the best tactic for an OSP is to come up with a safe and sane network policy in which logs are retained for the shortest possible time..."


Under Canadian privacy laws (at least until retention requirements are imposed under lawful access guidelines), ISPs/OPSs should only be collecting for reasonable purposes and keeping it for only as long as is reasonably necessary for the purposes for which it was collected. I know of at least one ISP that keeps their log files indefinitely because they enjoy their friendly relationship with law enforcement. They still require a warrant, but the cops know that it is all kept. Some organizations want to minimise the muss and fuss of being dragged into court being asked to provide user info. If they simply don't have the info that is being sought, they say so and avoid the issue. (This issue has also come to the fore in public libraries, where privacy aware librarians have changed practices to delete the history of borrowers after books are returned undamaged.)

Thanks to the ever-informative, always useful BeSpacific for the link.

Jurisdictional limits on Canadian privacy law

David T.S. Fraser*


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This article is reprinted from the February 2005 edition of the Canadian Privacy Law Review (2:5), Michael Geist, editor-in-chief.


Canada's federal privacy law is already hobbled by the country’s constitutional division of powers. By relying upon the federal parliament’s “general trade and commerce” powers, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (“PIPEDA”) cannot apply to the provincially regulated workplace. Likewise, it cannot apply to the non-commercial operations of charities and the “MUSH” sector, meaning municipalities, universities, schools and hospitals. While there are sectors beyond PIPEDA’s reach, the question of whether PIPEDA applies to commercial activities that take place outside Canada's borders remains.

Until recently, the putative position of officials from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner has been that PIPEDA can apply to the collection, use and disclosure of personal information about Canadians by foreign companies. The issue has ceased to be theoretical thanks to an unpublished finding of the Assistant Privacy Commissioner dealing with a complaint brought by the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic (“CIPPIC”), associated with the University of Ottawa Law School. In the Assistant Commissioner’s letter to CIPPIC,[1] her office declined to initiate an investigation because the company involved had no presence in Canada. This represents a complete reversal from the previous (unofficial and hypothetical) position of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner.

The letter from the Assistant Commissioner was issued in response to a complaint under PIPEDA launched by CIPPIC against Abika.com, a U.S. company that harvests databases and public sources to produce reports that allegedly include personal information up to and including psychosexual profiles of individuals. This service provides information on Americans and Canadians. CIPPIC filed its complaint in June, claiming that Abika collects, uses, and discloses the personal information of Canadians without consent in violation of Canada's national privacy law.

In its response, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner noted that the company does not have a physical presence in Canada. This led to their conclusion that “while the organization may well be collecting information on Canadians, our legislation does not extend to investigating organizations located only in the United States. We are, therefore, unable to investigate this matter under PIPEDA.” This conclusion came as a surprise to many because of the unofficial position taken by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner when the question was merely theoretical.

At the risk of only minimal controversy, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner could have asserted jurisdiction to investigate and then dealt with the challenges of enforcement. Modern Canadian principles of conflict of laws, following such seminal cases as Morguard Investments v. De Savoye[2], Tolofson v. Jensen,[3] and Hunt v. T & N PLC[4] provide a strong basis to argue that Canada’s privacy laws can reach beyond its borders where there is a clear and substantial connection with Canada. Such a decision would at least have left the complainant with the ability to take the finding to the Federal Court of Canada to explore whether the Court would fashion a remedy and whether the cooperation of U.S. authorities could be obtained. Declining to accept jurisdiction left the complainant with one option: to seek judicial review of this decision, completely separate from the merits of the original complaint.

At least in its origins, PIPEDA was designed to be a piece of an international system to protect the privacy of consumers and citizens. All privacy statutes in Canada trace their roots back to an initiative undertaken by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) to establish basic levels for the protection of personal information among member states.[5] The 1980 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data was signed by Canada in 1984 but was never formally adopted into Canadian law, though they eventually found their way into the Privacy Act[6] that governs personal information in the custody of the federal government and certain crown agents. According to the former Canadian Privacy Commissioner:

[a]mong the most influential modern formulations of the desire to protect against excessively curious governments and businesses has been the OECD's 1980 Guidelines for the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data. In 1984, Canada joined 22 other industrialized nations by adhering to the guidelines. The guidelines were intended to harmonize data protection laws and practices among OECD member countries by establishing minimum standards for handling personal data. The guidelines were not themselves enforceable, but they became the starting point for data protection legislation in countries around the world, including Canada.[7]

The OECD guidelines contain eight fundamental principles of national application dealing with the collection, use, disclosure and retention of personal information.

Following the OECD guidelines, the European community decided to implement and harmonize private sector privacy legislation throughout the continent. The result of this initiative was the European Data Protection Directive[8] which required all member countries of the European Union to implement legislation protecting personal information, hopefully to provide a seamless privacy regime throughout Europe. Most notably, the European Directive included a provision that prevented the transmission of any personal information outside of the European Union unless the recipient country had legislation in place that would offer substantially similar protections. While this provision does not purport to operate extraterritorially, it is demonstrative of an attempt to specifically regulate the cross-border movement of personal information. There is also little doubt that it had an extraterritorial effect.

In the absence of similar and recognized legislation in Canada, the European Data Protection Directive would have prevented the free flow of personal information between Canada and member states of the European Union. The modern economy is predicated on the flow of personal information, either as a good in and of itself or ancillary to other transactions. The prohibitions contained in the European Directive would have amounted to a non-tariff trade barrier between Europe and Canada.

In response to the European Directive and a perceived need to boost electronic commerce, the Canadian government introduced legislation that, it was hoped, would be considered by Europe to be sufficiently similar to the Directive. Both the OECD Guidelines and the European Directive provide the international context in which PIPEDA was born.

In disposing of questions such as the one considered by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Canadian courts consider whether there is a “real and substantial” connection between the matter at issue and Canada. If the answer is “yes”, the courts may assume jurisdiction. The “real and substantial connection” test has been more recently used by the Supreme Court of Canada in Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Association of Internet Providers.[9] In the SOCAN decision, Justice Binnie reviewed the general principles of the extraterritoriality of Canadian laws and concluded that the Canadian Copyright Act[10] may apply to cross-border activities where there is a “real and substantial connection” with Canada:

¶54 While the Parliament of Canada, unlike the legislatures of the Provinces, has the legislative competence to enact laws having extraterritorial effect, it is presumed not to intend to do so, in the absence of clear words or necessary implication to the contrary. This is because "[i]n our modern world of easy travel and with the emergence of a global economic order, chaotic situations would often result if the principle of territorial jurisdiction were not, at least generally, respected"; see Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022, at p. 1051, per La Forest J.

¶55 While the notion of comity among independent nation States lacks the constitutional status it enjoys among the provinces of the Canadian federation (Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, at p. 1098), and does not operate as a limitation on Parliament's legislative competence, the courts nevertheless presume, in the absence of clear words to the contrary, that Parliament did not intend its legislation to receive extraterritorial application.

¶56 Copyright law respects the territorial principle, reflecting the implementation of a "web of interlinking international treaties" based on the principle of national treatment (see D. Vaver, Copyright Law (2000), at p. 14).

¶57 The applicability of our Copyright Act to communications that have international participants will depend on whether there is a sufficient connection between this country and the communication in question for Canada to apply its law consistent with the "principles of order and fairness ... that ensure security of [cross-border] transactions with justice"; see Morguard Investments Ltd., supra, at p. 1097; see also Unifund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 63, 2003 SCC 40, at para. 56; R. Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (4th ed. 2002), at pp. 601-602.

¶58 Helpful guidance on the jurisdictional point is offered by La Forest J. in Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178. That case involved a fraudulent stock scheme. U.S. purchasers were solicited by telephone from Toronto, and their investment monies (which the Toronto accused caused to be routed through Central America) wound up in Canada. The accused contended that the crime, if any, had occurred in the United States, but La Forest J. took the view that "[t]his kind of thinking has, perhaps not altogether fairly, given rise to the reproach that a lawyer is a person who can look at a thing connected with another as not being so connected. For everyone knows that the transaction in the present case is both here and there" (at p. 208 (emphasis added)). Speaking for the Court, he stated the relevant territorial principle as follows (at pp. 212-13):

I might summarize my approach to the limits of territoriality in this way. As I see it, all that is necessary to make an offence subject to the jurisdiction of our courts is that a significant portion of the activities constituting that offence took place in Canada. As it is put by modern academics, it is sufficient that there be a "real and substantial link" between an offence and this country ... [Emphasis added.]

¶59 So also, in my view, a telecommunication from a foreign state to Canada, or a telecommunication from Canada to a foreign state, "is both here and there". Receipt may be no less "significant" a connecting factor than the point of origin (not to mention the physical location of the host server, which may be in a third country). To the same effect, see Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 626, at para. 52; Kitakufe v. Oloya, [1998] O.J. No. 2537 (QL) (Gen. Div.). In the factual situation at issue in Citron v. Zundel, supra, for example, the fact that the host server was located in California was scarcely conclusive in a situation where both the content provider (Zundel) and a major part of his target audience were located in Canada. The Zundel case was decided on grounds related to the provisions of the Canadian Human Rights Act, but for present purposes the object lesson of those facts is nevertheless instructive.

¶60 … From the outset, the real and substantial connection test has been viewed as an appropriate way to "prevent overreaching ... and [to restrict] the exercise of jurisdiction over extraterritorial and transnational transactions" (La Forest J. in Tolofson, supra, at p. 1049). The test reflects the underlying reality of "the territorial limits of law under the international legal order" and respect for the legitimate actions of other states inherent in the principle of international comity (Tolofson, at p. 1047). A real and substantial connection to Canada is sufficient to support the application of our Copyright Act to international Internet transmissions in a way that will accord with international comity and be consistent with the objectives of order and fairness.

…

¶62 Canada clearly has a significant interest in the flow of information in and out of the country. Canada regulates the reception of broadcasting signals in Canada wherever originated; see Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, 2002 SCC 42. Our courts and tribunals regularly take jurisdiction in matters of civil liability arising out of foreign transmissions which are received and have their impact here; see WIC Premium Television Ltd. v. General Instrument Corp. (2000), 8 C.P.R. (4th) 1 (Alta. C.A.); Re World Stock Exchange (2000), 9 A.S.C.S. 658.

¶63 Generally speaking, this Court has recognized as a sufficient "connection" for taking jurisdiction, situations where Canada is the country of transmission (Libman, supra) or the country of reception (Canada v. Liberty Net, supra). This jurisdictional posture is consistent with international copyright practice.

…

¶76 Accordingly, the conclusion that Canada could exercise copyright jurisdiction in respect both of transmissions originating here and transmissions originating abroad but received here is not only consistent with our general law (Libman, supra, and Canada (HRC) v. Canadian Liberty Net, supra) but with both national and international copyright practice.

¶77 This conclusion does not, of course, imply imposition of automatic copyright liability on foreign content providers whose music is telecommunicated to a Canadian end user. Whether or not a real and substantial connection exists will turn on the facts of a particular transmission (Braintech, supra). It is unnecessary to say more on this point because the Canadian copyright liability of foreign content providers is not an issue that arises for determination in this appeal, although, as stated, the Board itself intimated that where a foreign transmission is aimed at Canada, copyright liability might attach.


PIPEDA is not explicit about whether it is intended to apply extraterritorially, but there is some guidance in Section 4, the basis of the law’s application:

Application

4. (1) This Part applies to every organization in respect of personal information that

(a) the organization collects, uses or discloses in the course of commercial activities; or

(b) is about an employee of the organization and that the organization collects, uses or discloses in connection with the operation of a federal work, undertaking or business.


The application section is entirely silent with respect to its intended territorial application. The only reference to specific jurisdictions are contained in the transitional provisions and the definition of “federal work, undertaking or business”. The transition provisions begin with Section 30:

DIVISION 5

TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

Application

30. (1) This Part does not apply to any organization in respect of personal information that it collects, uses or discloses within a province whose legislature has the power to regulate the collection, use or disclosure of the information, unless the organization does it in connection with the operation of a federal work, undertaking or business or the organization discloses the information outside the province for consideration.

Application

(1.1) This Part does not apply to any organization in respect of personal health information that it collects, uses or discloses.

Expiry date

*(2) Subsection (1) ceases to have effect three years after the day on which this section comes into force.

*[Note: Section 30 in force January 1, 2001, see SI/2000-29.]

Expiry date

*(2.1) Subsection (1.1) ceases to have effect one year after the day on which this section comes into force.

*[Note: Section 30 in force January 1, 2001, see SI/2000-29.]



These provisions were temporary (and expired on January 1, 2004), as part of the gradual implementation of PIPEDA, providing individual provinces with the ability to put in place substantially similar legislation during the period in which the law only applied to the federally regulated private sector and cross-border sales of information. It may be notable that the cross-border reference says “outside the province” and not “to another province”.

In the absence of clear guidance from the statute, one can interpret it to apply in all circumstances where there exists a “real and substantial link” to Canada, following the Supreme Court's guidance in SOCAN and the cases to which Binnie J. refers. In any event, there is nothing in the statute that would prevent the Office of the Privacy Commissioner from assuming jurisdiction in the circumstances set out above if one takes the more modern and progressive view of jurisdiction that is currently being applied by the Canadian courts.

In the past, Officials with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner have advised that the Commissioner likely would assume jurisdiction where the collection of personal information is about Canadian residents or where the collection originates in Canada. This appears to no longer be the case. The Commissioner’s office used to be of the view that PIPEDA is part of an international scheme of privacy protection that could reach over borders. The Privacy Commissioner has an arguable basis to make this second assertion and assume jurisdiction. As mentioned above, Canada implemented PIPEDA following the OECD Guidelines and in light of threatened restrictions on cross-border data flows caused by the European Directive.

While Canada is not bound by either the European Directive or the OECD Guidelines, it appears to be the spirit of PIPEDA that the Canadian law fit within this general scheme of international data protection. This, in and of itself, would give support for investigating the complaint brought by CIPPIC. Nevertheless, modern Canadian conflict of law jurisprudence clearly gives a Canadian adjudicative body, tribunal or investigator jurisdiction over activities that take place outside of our frontiers if there is a “real and substantial” connection to Canada. Whether that connection exists in the CIPPIC’s complaint is both a question of law and a question of fact, two questions that the Assistant Commissioner appears not to have pursued. Unless CIPPIC seeks judicial review of the Assistant Commissioner’s decision not to investigate, it may be some time before the question in judicially considered.



* David T.S. Fraser is the chairman of the Privacy Practice Group at McInnes Cooper, Atlantic Canada’s largest single law partnership, principal legal advisor to National Privacy Services Inc. and the author of “PIPEDA and Canadian Privacy Law”, a privacy law weblog found at http://pipeda.blogspot.com/.

The genesis of this article is a presentation given by the author to the Canadian Bar Association Annual Meeting and Conference, August 2004.

[1] Available online at http://www.cippic.ca/en/projects-cases/privacy/opcc_response_30nov04.pdf.

[2] [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077.

[3] [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022.

[4] [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289.

[5] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (adopted 23 September 1980).

[6] Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21.

[7] Speech by Bruce Phillips to the Canadian Bar Association, “The Evolution of Canada's Privacy Laws” (January 28, 2000). Available online http://www.privcom.gc.ca/speech/archive/02_05_a_000128_e.asp.

[8] Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.

[9] 2004 SCC 45 (“SOCAN”).

[10] Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42.

Alberta Commissioner finds three businesses failed to protect personal information from identity thieves

The Alberta Information and Privacy Commissioner has released three investigation reports, castigating three Alberta businesses for failing to protect personal information from identity thieves.

Investigations find Alberta businesses failed to protect personal information from identity thieves

Recent investigations by the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner (OIPC) found that three Alberta businesses failed to protect personal information in their custody.

On November 24, 2004, Edmonton Police Service (EPS) notified the OIPC that documents containing personal information from a number of Alberta businesses were found during a police investigation. Some of the records were found in a motel room; others were subsequently turned over to police by two individuals charged with credit card fraud. The records included return of goods slips, debtor account files from a collection agency, and cell phone contracts. Personal information in the records included Social Insurance Numbers, bank account information, credit card numbers, and customer signatures.

In response to the information from EPS, Information and Privacy Commissioner Frank Work initiated investigations of Linens ‘N Things, Nor-Don Collection Network Inc., and Digital Communications Group Inc., under the Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA).

PIPA applies to private sector organizations in Alberta, and requires them to protect personal information against such risks as unauthorized access, collection, use, disclosure, copying, modification, disposal or destruction.

The investigators found that these businesses failed to protect personal information in their custody.

Recommendations from the investigations required all three organizations to contact the individuals whose information was, or may have been, exposed to identity theft. In at least one case this meant contacting hundreds of customers. Additional recommendations required the organizations to:

  • ensure all records containing personal information are stored securely,
  • limit access to personal information to staff on a “need-to-know” basis,
  • develop procedures for storage, retention and destruction of personal information, and
  • provide privacy and security training/awareness for employees.

One organization was also required to obtain computer equipment to obscure credit card numbers printed on receipts and return slips. Along with the affected individuals, these three businesses were victimized in these incidents, but each is responsible under PIPA for securing personal information.

The OIPC is advising other businesses not to put themselves in the same situation.

To obtain a copy of an Investigation Report, click the following links:

Investigation #P2005-IR-001 http://www.oipc.ab.ca/ims/client/upload/P2005_IR_001.pdf (Linens ‘N Things)

Investigation #P2005-IR-002 http://www.oipc.ab.ca/ims/client/upload/P2005_IR_002.pdf (Nor-Don Collection Network Inc.)

Investigation #P2005-IR-003 http://www.oipc.ab.ca/ims/client/upload/P2005_IR_003.pdf (Digital Communications Group Inc.)


Don't keep the data that you don't need

The recent controversey over subpoenas of high-profile search engines has spurred a lot of discussion about what search engines know about you. For example, John Battelle was able to get confirmation from Google of what a lot of people have probably always suspected:

1) "Given a list of search terms, can Google produce a list of people
who searched for that term, identified by IP address and/or Google
cookie value?"

2) "Given an IP address or Google cookie value, can Google produce a
list of the terms searched by the user of that IP address or cookie
value?"

I put these to Google. To its credit, it rapidly replied that the answer in both cases is "yes." Just FYI.



What else does Google know? Given that Google operates


  • one of the most widely used advertising networks,
  • one of the most widely used webmail services,
  • one of the most widely used mapping services,
  • one of the most widely used website statistics services,
  • one of the most widely used browser toolbars,
  • one of the most widely used news aggregators,
  • one of the most widely used online group services,

they know a heck of a lot. Every time you visit a site that uses adwords, your computer connects to google and tells them what you're viewing and probably what got you there. And all this can be matched by your google cookie or your IP address.

The question is, other than for personalized services, why should a company maintain information that is personally identifiable? Why keep logs that have your ip address down to the last digit when the same value can be obtained from the data by only keeping the first three units (192.168.168.* compared to 192.168.168.111)? The level of trust that consumers have for companies like Google is eroding and businesses should take heed of this. If you don't need the information in personally identifiable form, don't keep it.

It will not be long before the cost of keeping this stuff is prohibitive if you have to spend valuable personel time responding to subpoenas. I can imagine the FBI or some other three-letter-agency having a form subpoena that will seek all the records from Google, Yahoo!, DoubleClick and others about the supposed "owner" of a suspicious IP address. What did you search for? What did you read? When were you online? All this info is mantained by a small handful of companies.



UPDATE: While you're thinking about this, check out Google's data minefield by Mark Rasch (via robhyndman.com).

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Risks and rewards of data retention

Michael Geist's weekly LawBytes column is about the Risks and Rewards of Data Retention.

IP addresses are personal information

Adam Fields' blog has a good post about the "big fuss" over IP addresses, which is particularly relevant in light of the fight over search logs and subpoenas from the US Department of Justice:

Adam
Fields (weblog) - What's the big fuss about IP addresses?
:

Given the recent fuss
about the government asking for search terms and what qualifies as personally
identifiable information, I want to explain why IP address logging is a big
deal. This explanation is somewhat simplified to make the cases easier to
understand without going into complete detail of all of the possible
configurations, of which there are many. I think I've kept the important stuff
without dwelling on the boundary cases, and be aware that your setup may differ
somewhat. If you feel I've glossed over something important, please leave a
comment.

First, a brief discussion of what IP addresses are and how they
work. Slightly simplified, every device that is connected to the Internet has a
unique number that identifies it, and this number is called an IP address.
Whenever you send any normal network traffic to any other computer on the
network (request a web page, send an email, etc...), it is marked with your IP
address....



I don't think there can be much doubt that an IP address is "personal information" for the purposes of PIPEDA or the Personal Information Protection Acts of BC and Alberta, particularly as it appears in a server log. The information does not have to "identify" an individual, but must be "information about an identifiable individual". George Radwanski, when he was federal Privacy Commissioner held, in Case Summary #25, that a PC's NetBIOS information is "personal information" for the purposes of PIPEDA because it can lead to iformation that is traceable to an identifiable individual. Whether that interpretation would hold up in court is debateable, but any business in Canada should proceed on the assumption that a user's IP address is their personal information.


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How to not be evil as an online business

Google's mantra apparently is "". While Google has been generally applauded around the blogosphere for fighting the subpoena from the Department of Justice for search records, there are also a number of folks who are concerned that Google's privacy practices are less than transparent.

The general public are paying much more attention to the privacy practices of companies, particularly as government agencies are getting more and more inquisitive about records that are maintained by the private sector. In Europe, for example, governments are requiring companies to keep records for much longer than usual on the hope that they'll come in handy for tracking down terrorists (and file-sharers) (). Right now, MSN and Yahoo! are in the crosshairs for handing over data to the US Department of Justice. MSN has even posted its own defence of their cooperation with the US government (see: The Canadian Privacy Law Blog: Microsoft responds to subpoena controversey). Recently in Canada, a number of internet service providers went to great expense to resist handing over customer information in the face of the recording industry's demands (see: The Canadian Privacy Law Blog: The new test for disclosure of identities after BMG v John Doe).

How can companies avoid being drawn into this no-win situation? It is incredibly simple (and happens to be the law in Canada):




  1. Don't collect any information that you do not need

  2. If you don't need information that is personally indentifiable for your legitimate business purpose, simply do not collect it.
  3. Don't keep any personally identifiable information that you do not need

  4. If you no longer need information in personally indentifiable form, don't keep it. Or if the information is still of use, don't keep it in personally identifiable form. Remove all identifiers. Irretrievably sever the link between the data and the individual. Aggregate it. Whatever you need to do, do it.

Being the custodian of information about identifiable individuals carries risk. It can be stolen. It can be hacked. It can be mis-used. It can be lost. And, it can be the subject of a subpoena. In the former examples, it can render a company subject to liability for any losses suffered by the individual. In the latter case, you can either fight disclosing the data or you can deal with the adverse publicity that may ensue.

In short, if you don't want to look like a stooge for the authorities or zealous litigants, or you don't want to pay the legal fees associated with fighting the disclosure request, don't keep the information in the first place. If you don't need it, don't collect it. If you no longer need it, get rid of it. (Securely, of course.)

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Privacy International's Response to European Commission's consultation on telecommunications traffic data retention

On 30 July 2004, the European Commission's Directorate Generals on the Information Society and on Justice and Home Affairs issued a consultation document inquiring about the desirability of establishing a uniform pan-European retention regime for all internet and telecommunications traffic data for a period of 12-36 months. The deadline for submissions is 15 September 2004.

Privacy International (PI) and European Digital Rights (EDRI) have just released their submission on the topic, entitled "Invasive, Illusory, Illegal, and Illegitimate" (three guesses what their position is!). The PI/EDRI submission is an interesting summary of the kinds of data that can be collected and the privacy impact of indiscriminate retention of this data.

The Canadian Department of Justice began a consultation on "Lawful Access" in August 2002 which proposed, among other things, the capability for law enforcement to issue "Data Preservation Orders", perhaps without a warrant or other judicial authorization.

Those interested in a free-wheeling debate on the topic can check out the discussion on the European consultation at Slashdot.

European telcos come out against proposed retention law

European telecommunications companies are coming out strongly against the proposed data retention rules that would require telcos to collect and retain information about users of telecommunications services throughout the continent. The proposal, if implmented, would cost millions of pounds/euros, they say and would violate European data protection laws. See: Belfast Telegraph: Storing mobile records 'would cost millions'.

National student database raises privacy concerns in the US

Privacy and student activists in the United States are concerned about the implications of a proposed database that will track all post-secondary students in the United States. The Harvard Crimson has a good overview of the proposed system and the concerns being expressed.

The Harvard Crimson Online :: Feds May Launch Student Database:
Records will track academics, tuition payments and financial aid benefits
:

"Federal officials are considering a proposal to launch a massive database that would track college students' academic progress, tuition payments and financial aid benefits in an effort to gather improved data on higher education.

Proponents of the move say the expanded database could help officials craft more sensible public policies. Opponents fear that the plan could facilitate large-scale infringements on students' privacy.

The proposal--currently being vetted by Department of Education officials--would expand an existing database to allow researchers to track individual students who drop out of college or transfer between institutions. It would include information ranging from social security numbers to participation in varsity sports."



Before Canadian readers think "how long until this comes to Canada?", they may be surprised to learn that this is already here:

InfoSource: Statistics Canada 7 / 11:

"Postsecondary Student Database

Description: The information in this bank is obtained from the administrative files of Canadian universities and other postsecondary institutions (community colleges, CEGEPs). It includes demographic data, and information relating to the individual's activities as a student, such as qualification sought, discipline of specialization, and previous educational activity. There are no names in this data bank. Consequently, for retrieval purposes, it is necessary to use the number assigned to the individual by the institution and the year(s) the individual has studied at that institution. Class of Individuals: This bank contains annual information on full-time and part-time students in Canadian postsecondary institutions. Purpose: The purpose of this bank is to produce statistical information on student by province, institution, program and sex. Retention and Disposal Standards: The files are to be retained for 55 years. RDA Number: To be established. Related to PR#: STC ECT 170 TBS Registration: 001855 Bank Number: STC PPU 090"



One big difference is that the Canadian database is not available for routine law enforcement and national security browsing thanks to the secrecy provisions of the Statistics Act.